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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOSPITAL CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The modern trend has been decisively in favor of the abolition or
limitation of the charitable immunity doctrine as it applies to hospital
tort liability." Various reasons have been given for this reform.2 A
new and interesting question has been raised as to the constitutionality
of this once firmly entrenched doctrine.
In the recent case of Neely v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nurs-
ing, Inc.,3 the constitutionality of a Kansas statute which conferred
immunity from process on charitable hospital corporations was ques-
tioned. The plaintiff had collected from the defendant charitable hos-
pital's insurance carrier up to the limits of insurance policy coverage
on an earlier judgment in a tort action commenced in 1958 against
the hospital.4 The plaintiff then proceeded in garnishment against
the hospital's bank and L. S. Lauer to recover the balance of the tort
judgment. In their answer, the hospital and garnishees invoked the
provision of a 1959 Kansas statute giving immunity to hospital prop-
2Howard v. Sisters of Charity, 193 F. Supp. 191 (D. Mont. 1961); Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 72 Ariz, 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. App. 2d 356,
232 P.2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Durney v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 46 Del. 35 o , 83
A.2d 753 (Super. Ct. 1951); Moore v. Maoyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950); Haynes
v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.V.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Men-
ninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp.
Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105
N.W.-d 1 (ig6o); Terracciona v. Magee, 53 N.J. Super. 557, 148 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct.
1959); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 565, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Avellone
v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Hungerford v. Port-
land Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Ore. 412, 384 P.2d ioo9 (1963); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (195o); Kojis v. Doctor's Hosp.,
12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
'These reasons perhaps can best be summarized by saying that there has been a
breakdown in the theories upon which immunity has been granted. There have
been at least five theories: (i) the trust fund theory; (2) the theory that the rule of
respondeat superior does not apply to charities; (3) the theory that the beneficiary
of a charity impliedly waives the liability of his benefactor for negligence or assumes
the risk of negligence; (4) the theory of governmental immunity and (5) the public
policy theory. For a discussion of these theories and their breakdown see Annot.,
25 A.L.R.2d 29, at 57-73 (1952); Prosser, Torts 1019-1023 (3 d ed. 1964).
3192 Kan. 716, 391 P.2d 155 (1964).
'In Neely v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 188 Kan. 546, 363 P.2d
438 (1961), the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $79,161.34. The hospital's insurance carrier paid the
plaintiff $58,166.77.
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erty.5 The trial court ruled against the appellant's motion for an
order requiring the garnishees to pay into court the amount shown
to be due and for judgment on the pleadings.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas attributed the adoption
of the statute to the reversal of the established charitable immunity
doctrine in Kansas in the 1954 case of Noel v. Menninger Foundation.
7
The court reviewed the language of that opinion with reference to
the constitutional guarantees protecting remedies for injury to per-
son, reputation, or property. In the Noel case, the court expressed sur-
prise that the question of the constitutionality of the charitable im-
munity doctrine had never been raised.8 While the statute was not
6The statute, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 17-1725 (Supp. 196,) reads: "Property, either
real or personal, together with the income therefrom or the proceeds from its dis-
position, belonging to a corporation organized not for profit and which oper-
ates or supports one or more hospitals, operated on a nonprofit basis, shall be
deemed to be held administered, or disposed of, in accordance with the articles of
incorporation and bylaws of such corporation, for the use and benefit of the present
and future beneficiaries of the service of such institution; and such property, income
or proceeds shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, execution, or other
forced disposition or process except for obligations owing to the state, or its sub-
division or agencies, or for obligations contractually assumed by such corporation
for the purpose of rendering its services, and performing its function, for such
beneficiaries."
GIt was stipulated and agreed that the appellee hospital was a non-profit cor-
poration properly organized under Kansas law.
7175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 ('954). The immunity statute questioned in the
principal case became effective March 31, 1959.
8"It is somewhat surprising to note that in none of the decisions establishing
the immunity doctrine in this state was the question ever presented or considera-
tion given to the provisions of our constitution. Section 18 of our bill of rights reads:
'All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.' It is clear
from plaintiff's petition that he has suffered injuries in person, and under our
state constitution he shall have remedy by due course of law. Rowell v. City of
Wichita, 162 Kan. 294, 300, 176 P.2d 59 o . Neither our constitution nor our statute
says anything about releasing charitable, educational or religious organizations
from liability for negligence which results in personal injuries to another. Sec-
tion 18 of our bill of rights is to the contrary. Thus it would appear that the
public policy of this state, as enumerated by its constitution, is to put justice 'by
due course of law' above or before charity. The constitution, article ii, § i, and our
statute, G.S. 1949, 79-201, do make provisions for releasing such institutions from
taxation. Had it been the intent of the framers of our constitution to grant im-
munity to charitable organizations for their torts, provisions would have been
made for such. The constitutional provision guaranteeing to every person a remedy
by due course of law for injury done him in person or property means that for such
wrongs that are recognized by the law of the land the court shall be open and
afford a remedy, or that laws shall be enacted giving a certain remedy for all injuries
or wrongs. 'Remedy by due course of law,' so used, means the reparation for injury
ordered by a tribunal having jurisdiction in due course of procedure after a fair
hearing. It is the primary duty of the courts to safeguard the declaration of right
CASE COMMENTS
a straightforward declaration of public policy conferring immunity
on charitable hospitals, the court considered the statute an attempt
to circumvent the constitutional guarantee indicated in the Noel
case and contained in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Kan-
sas,O and held the statute unconstitutional. 0 The retroactive effect of
the statute was not discussed. That is, the court did not pass on the
issue of whether the legislature had the power to make the statute
applicable to torts committed after the Noel decision and before the
statute was adopted.
The immunity of charitable hospitals from tort liability has been
developed primarily by the courts.'1 Consequently, the present law
with regard to charitable immunity is governed primarily by case law.1 2
In Kansas and five other states, however, legislation governs or directly
and remedy guaranteed by the constitutional provision insuring a remedy for all
injuries. 11 Am. Jur. 1124, 1125, Constitutional Law, § 326." Noel v. Menninger
Foundation, 175 Kan. 762-63, 267 P.2d 942-43 (1954).
"'All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay." Kan. Const.,
Bill of Rights § i8.
"Garnishment was held to be a "special proceeding" under Kansas law, and
therefore, a remedy guaranteed by the constitution. As authority for this, the
court cited Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 6o-1o3, 104, and 1o5 (1949). The court also cited
Andrews v. Andrews, 171 Kan. 616, 237 P.2d 418 (1951), which said that garnish-
ment was "a special and extraordinary remedy." The appellee contended that a dis-
tinction should be made between remedy and recovery. It was their position that
the appellant had a remedy as evidenced by her recovery against the insurance
carrier, and that there was no state or federal constitutional guarantee of a full
recovery to the prevailing party. To support their position, the appellees cited
various Kansas statutes in which garnishment was available as a remedy, but where
legislative exemptions had been created barring recovery against certain property,
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3494, 3495, 3504, 3505, and 3508 (1949). In addition, they
cited bankruptcy laws as an example where a remedy by due course of laws is guar-
anteed but where a full recovery may be precluded.
In rejecting the appellees' arguments, the court stated that bankruptcy was a
federal matter which superseded state laws. The Kansas statutes cited fall into two
categories: (i) Those pertaining to, or supplementing, the homestead exemption
guaranteed by the state constitution, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3504, 3505, and
3508 (1949); and (2) Those exempting, within certain limits, the personal earning of
judgment debtors who comply with the statute, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3494 and
3495 (1949). The court distinguished these statutes from the one in the principal
case in that in these statutes non-exempt property was subject to forced process,
hence a full recovery was not precluded. In conclusion, the court stood on the
constitutional construction laid down in the Menninger case quoting the following
language: "' It is the primary duty of the courts to safeguard the declaration of
right and remedy guaranteed by the constitutional provision insuring a remedy
for all injuries.'" 391 P.2d at ,6o (1964).
"For a discussion of the historical development see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, at
38-40 (1952).
1Id. at 4o n.i.
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affects the immunity of charitable hospitals.13 Rhode Island by statute14
grants immunity to the charitable hospital in actions brought by the
patient. New Jersey by statute15 limits the amount for which a chari-
table hospital is liable to a patient. Maryland by statute0 permits
suit only when liability insurance has been purchased. Arkansas 17 and
Louisiana' 8 have statutes which allow suits directly against the insurers
of charitable institutions. The Kansas statute 19 embodies principles
similar to those expressed in the case law of Arkansas, 20 Colorado,21
Georgia,22 Illinois, 23 and Tennessee 24 which limit the funds of chari-
table hospitals that can be reached by execution on a judgment. The
effect of the decisions in these jurisdictions has been to impose liability
to the extent of the hospital's insurance coverage.25
There are two views as to whether the courts or the legislature
should alter or amend the charitable immunity doctrine. The prevail-
ing view is that since the courts introduced the rule, they should
change it if the legislature does not.26 The minority view is that the
'Arkansas, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey and Rhode Island.
"'R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-1-22 (1956).
'N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 5 3 A- 7 , 8, 9, and io (Supp. 1963).
'0Md. Ann. Code art. 4 8A § 480 (1957). The statute provides that the policy must
contain a provision estopping the insurer from asserting the defense of charitable
immunity.
:"Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1963). The suit may be brought against the
insurer even though the tortfeasor is immune.
"La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655 (1950). The insurer may not raise the defense of
charitable immunity. Stamos v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. La.
1954).
"Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-1725 (Supp. 1961).
mFordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550,
96 S.W. 155 (1906).
mSt. Lukes c-losp. Ass'n v. Lonk, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
nMorton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918); Executive Comm.
of the Baptist Convention v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App. 393, 98 S.E.2d 50 (1957).
2nMoore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (195o).
24McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 17o Tenn. 423, 95 S.W.2d 917 (1936).
-Cox v. De Jarnette, 1o4 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (196,); Moore v. Moyle,
405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (195o); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App.
135, 127 S.W.2d 284 (1938).
In Arkansas a statute limits the recovery to the amount provided for in the
insurance policy. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1963).
"'Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger
Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361
Mich. 1, 1o5 N.W.2d 1 (1g6o); Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55
So. 2d 142 (1951); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d
276 (1958); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957);
Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium &= Benevolent Ass'n, 235 Ore. 412, 384 P.2d
1oo9 (1963); Kojis v. Doctors Hosp. 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (ig6i).
See also 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1485 (1938) which points out that the courts usurped
the legislative function of declaring public policy when they granted immunity,
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courts are bound by precedent, and since charitable immunity is a
policy matter, it must be the subject of legislative action.27 Legislative
inaction has been thought to indicate approval.28 A persuasive argu-
ment for the second view has been based on the retroactive effect of
a court overruling prior decisions.29 Such action may be considered
prejudicial to the charitable hospitals which had a right to rely on
their immunity.30 Legislation which operates prospectively negates
this problem.3 '
The question whether the charitable immunity doctrine violates
a constitutional guarantee of a remedy "by due course of law" has
arisen in two categories of cases. Firstly, in the absence of legislation,
some courts have had to determine whether the constitutional pro-
vision prohibited the adoption of the doctrine or required the over-
ruling of prior decisions adopting the doctrine. Secondly, some courts
have had to rule on the constitutionality of legislation adopting the
doctrine.
In Florida and Pennsylvania, the constitutional issue was raised
in the absence of legislation. The Supreme Court of Florida, in
Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp.,3 2 a case of first impression on
the issue of charitable immunity in Florida, established a policy of
no immunity. In considering whether immunity should be granted as
a matter of public policy, the court said: "[T]he public policy of a
state or nation should be determined by its Constitution, laws, and
judicial decisions .... ,,"3 The court noted that the state constitution
exempted charitable corporations from taxation, but that there was
not any constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority for exempt-
ing charitable corporations from tort liability. There was a consti-
and concludes that, "It would be strange for these same courts to sit back and
wait for the legislatures to reverse the value of judgments the courts have made."
Id. at 1489.
'Toley v. Wesson Memorial Hosp., 246 Mass. 363, 141 N.E. 113 (1923); Muller
v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 16o Neb. 279, 7o N.W.2d 86 (1955); Williams v.
Randolph Hosp., 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953); Michael v. Hahnemann. Medi-
cal College & Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
'E.g., Gregory v. Salem Gen. Hosp., 175 Ore. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944).
mE.g., Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d
769 (1961).
3OIbid.
mIbid. See, however, the technique of prospective overruling as used in the
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), and employed by the
Michigan court in abrogating charitable immunity. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp.,
361 Mich 1, io5 N.V.2d 1 (196o).
m145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
"Id. at 347.
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tutional provision guaranteeing a person remedy by the course of
law.34 The court stated:
"Thus it would appear that the public policy of this state, as
enunciated by its Constitution, is to put justice 'by due course of law'
above or before charity."3 5
The court further concluded that the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior was "so much a part of 'due course of law' 36 that absent some
exemption created by the state legislature, the courts should abide
by the provision in the state constitution.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, in reaffirming its court-estab-
lished doctrine of immunity for charitable hospitals in Michael v.
Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp.,37 took an entirely different view
from the Nicholson case of the doctrine of respondeat superior and
the constitutional guarantee of "a remedy by due course of law." 38
The court said:
"The Constitution does not mention, let alone grant, a rem-
edy against persons who do not commit an injury, but are
liable, if at all, under the judicially created doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not
covered, included or even mentioned in this or in any other sec-
tion of the Constitution."3 9
The court concluded that since it was admitted the injured party
had a remedy against the person who inflicted the injury, the plaintiff's
contention of the unconstitutionality of the prior decisions in that
state40 was based on the fact that the party might not be financially
able to pay, and therefore, the constitution should be extended to in-
clude some party able to pay. The court rejected this contention.4 1
In all three states which have granted statutory immunity, issues
3 "All courts in this State shall be open, so that every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due
course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay." Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights, § 4.
5Supra note 32, at 348. This language is identical to that used in Noel v. Men-
ninger Foundation, supra note 8, and used in the principal case at page 158.
"Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 32, at 348.
''4o4 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d at 769 (g6i).
8"All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law...." Pa.
Const. Art. I, § ii.
D172 A.2d at 778.
4"Pennsylvania had by judicial decision granted charitable immunity for over
seventy years. Ibid.
4"The court expressly declined to say whether this should or should not be
changed in the constitution. Ibid.
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have been raised with regard to the constitutionality of the statute.
On April 28, 1958, the New Jersey Supreme Court in three decisions
overturned the doctrine of charitable immunity as established by
prior judicial decisions in that state.4 2 In one of the opinions, Col-
lopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary,43 the court rejected the argu-
ment that it could not constitutionally overturn the immunity doc-
trine. 44 The court stated that the legislature could at any time consti-
tutionally establish the state's policy of immunity.45 On July 22, 1958,
the New Jersey legislature reinstated with limitation the charitable
immunity doctrine.4 6 Subsequently, in Terracciona v. Magee,47 the
New Jersey court held that the statute operated prospectively, did not
destroy a vested property right, and was, therefore, not violative of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution.48
In Rhode Island, the Supreme Court originally held that a chari-
table hospital could be held liable for failure of its servants or agents
to exercise due care in carrying out the hospital's assumed responsi-
bility to provide medical care for its patients.4 9 Subsequently, in 1896,
'2Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958); Collopy
v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); and Benton v.
Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 297 (1958).
' 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
"The court considered that, while it was adopted as part of the common law
of England, the state constitution had not been construed as meaning that common
law holdings could not be changed in view of changing conditions.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Heher took the position that under the state
constitution such a policy matter required legislative change.
4 In the language of the court: "There is no doubt that within constitutional
limits the Legislature may at any time, if it so choose, explicitly fix the State's policy
as to the immunity of charitable institutions from tort responsibilities. But the
Legislature has not done so; it has broadly empowered nonprofit corporations
to sue 'and be sued'...; and it has never in any form voiced approval of the
immunity of charitable institutions though it has expressly legislated for im-
munities in other fields." Id. at 283.
"N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:53A-7 , 8, 9, and so (Supp. 1963).
'_53 N.J. Super. 557, 148 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct. 1959).
"SThe plaintiff had been injured on March 5, 1954, and brought an action
for personal injury on March 1, 1956. The affirmative defense of charitable im-
munity was first asserted on January 2, 1957. The doctrine of charitable immunity
was overruled on April 28, 1958, and legislatively reinstated with limitation on
July 22, 1958. A pretrial order dated November 12, 1958, contained the asserted
defense of charitable immunity. The Terracciano case was an appeal from the
plaintiff's motion to amend the order by deleting this defense. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that in view of the retrospective effect of overruling the im-
munity doctrine, the plaintiff had a valid vested right of action free of the defense
of charitable immunity. (This is precisely the problem pointed out by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., supra
note 37.)
4'Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879).
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the General Assembly enacted a statute which granted immunity to
charitable hospitals in actions by patients.5° In the recent case of Forn-
ier v. Miriam Hosp.,51 the defendant invoked the provisions of this
statute. The plaintiff, in demurring on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional in that it violated both the state52 and federal5 3 con-
stitutions, raised three constitutional issues.
Firstly, the plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island had recognized the common-law rule applicable to charitable
immunity in Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp.,54 and therefore, the statute
was a legislative deprivation of a common law vested right protected
by the state constitution. 55 The court refused to construe the constitu-
tional guarantee of "remedy, by having recourse to the laws" as mean-
ing that the legislature could not make distinctions in derogation of a
common-law rule.
56
Secondly, the plaintiff argued that the immunity statute violated
the federal constitution in that it resulted in a denial of due process
and constituted discrimination in violation of the equal privilege
and protection clause.57 In rejecting this argument, the court adopted
the language of an earlier opinion: "Although, in a free government,
every man is entitled to an adequate legal remedy for every injury
done to him, yet the form and extent of it is necessarily subject to the
legislative power....,58 In addition, the court felt that the immunity
raThe statute which is now R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-1-22 (1956) reads as follows:
"No hospital incorporated by the general assembly of this state sustained in whole
or in part by charitable contributions or endowments, or the Notre Dame Hospital,
incorporated under chapter 1925 of the public laws, 1920, so long as it continues
to be sustained in whole or in part by charitable contributions or endowments, shall
be liable for the neglect, carelessness, want of skill or for the malicious act, of any
of its officers, agents or employees in the management of, or for the care or treat-
ment of, any of the patients or inmates of such hospital; but nothing herein contain-
ed shall be so construed as to impair any remedy under existing laws which any per-
son may have against any officer, agent or employee of any such hospital for any
wrongful act or omission in the course of his official conduct or employment."51t75 A.2d 298 (R.I. i96i ) .
62'The state constitution provides: "Every person within this state ought to find
a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which
he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and
justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial; promptly and
without delay; conformably to the laws." R.I. Const. art. 1, § 5.
63U.S. Const. art. XIV, § 1.
r1L12 R.I. 411 (1879).
rR.I. Const. art. I, § 5; supra note 52.
51The court cited Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939). It ap-
pears clear from the language in that case that legal duties are determined as of the
time the alleged breach occurs.
r1U.S. Const. art. XIV, § i
5'Fournier v. Miriam tHosp., 175 A.2d 298, 3oi (R.I. 1961).
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statute was neither capricious nor arbitrary since it did not "discrim-
inate between persons, groups, or corporations falling within the same
classification."59
Thirdly, the plaintiff argued that the statute granting immunity
was unconstitutional since it abrogated the rule of respondeat super-
ior. The Rhode Island court adopted the view of the Pennsylvania
court on this issue 0 and stated: "The plaintiff here has not been
deprived of any right which was hers at the time the statute in ques-
tion was adopted. Her right arose later and the legislature has left
her with a remedy against the person or persons who were actually
negligent if such negligence existed in fact."'61
The principal case appears unique in holding that a legislative
declaration of a policy of charitable immunity is unconstitutional.
62
The statute as invoked in the principal case operated retroactively to
limit recovery. 63 It is submitted that the court could have decided
the case on the retroactive form of the statute rather than ruling on
the constitutionality of the legislatively endorsed doctrine of charitable
immunity for hospitals in Kansas.
WILLIAM DYER ANDERSON
Ibid.
r*Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., supra note 37.
The court pointed out that chronologically the development in Rhode Island
was the reverse of that in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, the immunity was es-
tablished by judicial decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took the posi-
tion that legislative inaction meant legislative approval of the policy as established
by the court.
While recognizing that the wording of the Pennsylvania constitution was
different (supra note 38), the Rhode Island court stated that "the spirit and intent
are identical."
01175 A.2d at 3o2.
01In looking at a collateral issue of the manner in which immunity was granted,
apparently in those jurisdictions which have by decision exempted funds of charita-
ble hospitals from execution on a judgment, no constitutional objection has been
sustained.
c3The plaintiff brought the tort action on March 27, 1958, and judgment was
entered by the trial court on March ii, 196o. The judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Kansas on July 8, 1961. The statute granting immunity from
process was enacted in 1959.
The issue of legislative deprivation of rights was raised in Terracciona v. Magee,
53 N.J. Super. 557, 148 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct. 1959) and in Fournier v. Mariam Hosp.,
175 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1961) discussed earlier in this article. See text and footnotes 47,
48 and 54-56.
